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Culture: the missing link?
An influential line of research starting with North
(1981) and continuing with Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2001) has stressed the importance of dis-
tant history as one of the main determinants of cur-
rent economic development. In particular, economic
backwardness has been identified as a by-product of
a past history of despotism or slavery.But what is the
channel through which distant history shapes current
economic outcomes?
A widespread interpretation is “institutions”. How-
ever, economic and policy outcomes are often much
more persistent than the institutions which are sup-
posed to shape them.Institutions,in fact,may change
abruptly,and yet leave economic outcomes nearly un-
affected. Consider for example transitions from au-
tocracy to democracy and vice versa: while coups
seem to bring about a pronounced deterioration in
economic outcomes, democratic transitions are not
associated with comparably large improvements. On
the other hand,consider a country where political in-
stitutions have been the same for centuries. Within
that country, economic and policy outcomes may di-
verge across regions; these differences can be traced
back to different regional histories in the past,whose
legacy persists in spite of identical political and legal
institutions.In Italy,for instance,it is well known that
hospitals, courts, schools and local governments are
much less efficient in the South than in the North.
Clearly,the persistence in institutional outcomes can-
not be fully explained by looking at formal institu-
tions only: something else, besides institutional iner-
tia, must account for this legacy of history.
Political economy explains this persistence with refer-
ence to the redistributive conflicts and economic in-
centives of political and economic élites who shape in-
stitutions so as to preserve their status quo rents.
However, economic incentives alone fail to explain
several institutional failures:why does a civil lawsuit in
Southern Italy last three times as much as in Northern
Italy,in spite of identical legislation and incentives,and
similar resources? Why do rational voters keep voting
for corrupt politicians? More generally, why is it pos-
sible to overcome the collective action problem, the
core of almost any form of political participation, in
some situations,but not in others? The problem is that
while individual incentives play a crucial role in most
economic situations, this is not the case in several po-
litical situations, in which aggregate outcomes reflect
the actions of many atomistic individuals. Moreover,
inside government organizations, incentives are gen-
erally weak,due to lack of competition.
Besides purely economic incentives, we should de-
vote our attention also to other relevant drivers of
individual behavior, such as morality. One’s belief
about the behavior of other people, for example, ex-
erts a strong influence on voters’ demands and on cit-
izens’ participation; one’s perception of what is right
or wrong determines the extent of moral hazard in-
side public organizations. In other words, “culture”,
by which we mean primarily normative values on
what is “right”or “wrong”and how one “ought”to be-
have in given circumstances, is likely to affect the
functioning of institutions.
Values are largely transmitted vertically, from one
generation to the next, in a conservative mechanism
which takes place mostly within the family, rather
than across unrelated individuals. As suggested also
by Roland (2004) and Guiso et al. (2006), such slow
moving values can indeed be the “missing link”
through which distant political history influences the
functioning of current institutions and current devel-
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tional outcomes.
Two stylized facts, discussed in detail in Tabellini
(2008), suggest that this is indeed the case. First, it
makes sense to talk about the quality of government
as a general feature of countries: some countries are
governed “well” in many policy areas and others are
governed “poorly” also in many areas. This is con-
firmed by cross country data (Tabellini 2008), show-
ing that government failures and successes are corre-
lated across many different policy dimensions. That
policy distortions and government inefficiencies are
often clustered together seems to suggest that they
may have a common cause. Second, culture is slow
moving: exploiting data on third generation immi-
grants to the US,Tabellini (2008) shows that current
values,extrapolated by the World Value Surveys opin-
ion polls, reflect features of the country of origin of
the respondents’ ancestors. Similar results have also
been obtained by Guiso et al. (2006).This article re-
views the main results in these recent contributions,
drawing on Tabellini (2008; 2009).
Values and institutional outcomes
The first question to be addressed is which cultural
traits are especially important in explaining institu-
tional outcomes,and in particular which ones are like-
ly to induce well-functioning institutions.
One key contraposition is between values consistent
with “limited”as opposed to “generalized”morality;
the distinction concerns the scope of application of
norms of good conduct: within a narrow group with
which the individual identifies, or towards every-
body.In hierarchical societies,codes of good conduct
tend to be confined to small circles of related people,
outside which opportunistic and selfish behavior is
regarded as natural and morally acceptable. In his
case study of life in a rural village in Southern Italy
(The Moral Basis of a Backward Society 1958), po-
litical scientist Edward Banfield calls this attitude
“amoral familism”, referring to the fact that princi-
ples of good and evil are applied inside the family
only. In modern democratic societies, on the other
hand, abstract rules of good conduct apply to many
social situations. As argued by Max Weber ([1905]
1970), the emancipation of the individual from feu-
dal arrangements has typically been associated with
a diffusion of generalized morality. Yet, the distinc-
tion generalized/limited morality is still relevant to-
day, in order to understand cultural differences be-
tween different countries or regions.
The idea that generalized morality leads to better col-
lective outcomes has a long history in political science
and has recently been gaining grounds in economics
as well.The relevance of culture and morality to the
functioning of institutions has been stressed amongst
others by Landes (1998) and Platteau (2000). A re-
lated idea is that a civic culture and a well-educated
population are an important prerequisite to a well
functioning and stable democracy, as highlighted, in-
ter alia, by Glaeser et al. (2006), and Persson and
Tabellini (2006).
Generalized morality norms are likely to instill con-
fidence and respect for abstract principles such as the
rule of law, the respect for individual rights and for
democratic procedures. Hence they are likely to in-
duce reciprocal cooperation and discourage free rid-
ing,with virtuous consequences not only for the eco-
nomic behavior of individuals but also for their par-
ticipation in the political and administrative life of
their local communities.The latter is crucial to ensure
an adequate provision of local public goods and to
monitor political representatives or local administra-
tors. Thus, generalized morality is conducive to well
functioning institutions through at least three chan-
nels: law enforcement is easier because citizens are
more likely to be law abiding (eg.,less likely to cheat
on taxes); bureaucrats are less corrupt; voters expect
and demand higher standards of behavior from politi-
cians,monitor public administrators more effectively
and are more inclined to vote based on general social
welfare rather than personal benefit criteria.
On the other hand, in societies where limited moral-
ity is prevalent, individualism is mistrusted; the role
for the state,as well as for parental education,is a re-
pressive one:good behavior is deemed to result from
coercion,not from internalization of the values of so-
ciety.Such coercive cultural environments stifle indi-
vidual initiative and entrepreneurship as well as co-
operation within a group,with adverse consequences
on economic development.Aghion et al. (2009) sug-
gest that low levels of social capital induce a strong
demand for government regulation;conversely,a high
level of regulation discourages civic behavior, since,
when entrepreneurship is restricted through regula-
tion, investment in social capital may not pay off. In
their model, values and institutions mutually affect
each other:when people expect to live in an “uncivic”
community,they expect high levels of regulation and
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corruption, and do not invest in social capital; their
expectations are fulfilled and the society ends up
trapped in a “bad equilibrium”with high levels of cor-
ruption and regulation.
The empirics
At the empirical level,it is possible to construct mea-
sures for the diffusion of norms of generalized vs lim-
ited morality at an aggregate level exploiting the at-
titudes revealed by The World Value Surveys opinion
polls (Inglehart et al. 2000). A variable extensively
used in the economic literature is trust,defined as the
fraction of respondents believing that “most people
can be trusted”.This has been interpreted in two al-
ternative, but not mutually exclusive ways: as belief
about the behavior of others, and as an indicator of
moral values and trustworthiness.A moral interpre-
tation has been advocated amongst others by Ulsaner
(2005), who has shown that trust is a very persistent
individual feature correlated with charitable contri-
butions and volunteering,and by Glaeser et al.(2000).
In a similar way we can construct the variable respect,
as the fraction of respondents who claim to consider
“tolerance and respect for others” as an important
quality which children should be encouraged to learn
at home.These two cultural traits encapsulate what
earlier studies have called “social capital”.One of the
possible interpretations of these variables is as mea-
sures for individual values related to generalized
morality;conversely,lack of trust and lack of respect
for others’ actions are typical of hierarchical, coer-
cive societies dominated by limited morality. The
above-mentioned variables can be considered in iso-
lation or combined to construct a summary measure
of the cultural traits favorable to the good function-
ing of institutions.
In cross-country data,trusthas been shown to be cor-
related both with favorable economic outcomes and
with indicators of well functioning institutions. The
latter are measured by perceptions of bureaucratic
quality and indicators of property rights protection.
Although this correlation should not carelessly be in-
terpreted as evidence of a causal link, the explana-
tory power of culture in cross-country regressions is
remarkable. Consider, for example, the Netherlands
and Italy, two countries at comparable levels of de-
velopment but respectively close to the top and bot-
tom of the distribution of the governance indicator
amongst the OECD countries:according to the spec-
ification of Tabellini (2008),over half their difference
in governance may be explained by differences in the
variables trust and respect.Aghion et al. (2009) have
also highlighted a strong negative correlation at the
cross-country level between trust and government
regulation.
The evidence from European regions
Drawing inferences from cross country data is prob-
lematic: countries diverge in a large number of eco-
nomic and political dimensions, so that the differ-
ences in economic outcomes may be due to factors
other than culture and not explicitly included in the
specification (omitted variables). Moreover, institu-
tions and culture are likely to interact with each oth-
er to determine economic development,and working
with cross-country data it is hard to disentangle the
two effects. Both shortcomings can be overcome by
exploiting variation in economic outcomes at the sub-
national level, focusing on the role of culture as a
channel of historical influence within, rather than
across, countries.
The importance of social capital within countries had
been stressed for the first time by political scientist
Robert Putnam in his seminal work on Italy’s civic di-
vide (1993), in which the diverging performances of
Italian regions are attributed to their different civic
traditions. In particular, Putnam points to the free
city-state experience during the Middle Ages and the
culture of independence which it fostered. Guiso et
al.(2008) test these conjectures investigating the his-
torical origins of social capital across Italian cities and
estimate that at least 50 percent of the North-South
gap in social capital is due to a lack of a free city-state
experience in the South.De Blasio and Nuzzo (2006)
also conduct a study on differences in social capital
across Italian regions.
Values can influence regional economic development
through a variety of channels:from the functioning of
the public administration,to criminal activities in the
region, to behavior inside private organizations. For
example, Ichino and Maggi (2000) investigate moral
hazard inside a large Italian bank with branches in
different regions, finding that absenteeism and mis-
conduct episodes are substantially more relevant in
the South.
Tabellini (2009) considers a sample of 69 regions lo-
cated in a small number of homogeneous Europeancountries.1The countries considered share the follow-
ing peculiarity: although formal and legal institutions
at the national level have been the same for 150 years
or more, there is a variety of regional political histo-
ries within each country. The key idea is to compare
current economic outcomes in European regions,con-
trolling for country-fixed effects,in such a way that the
effect of the common national institutions is removed.
At this point, it will be possible to determine to what
extent differences in economic performance can be ex-
plained by differences in culture,which in turn are in-
duced by different regional histories.2
Figure 1 shows the regional aver-
ages of the summary variable
pc_culture3 and regional per ca-
pita output (measured as average
gross value added over the peri-
od 1995–2000).The regional pat-
tern of culture is strikingly simi-
lar to that of per capita output.In
particular, Germany, England
and Northern Italy tend to have
high per capita output and posi-
tive cultural indicators, while
Southern Italy, Portugal and
Southern Spain fare worse on
both counts. The correlation,
however,is not perfect:in partic-
ular, France has high per capita
income in spite of cultural traits
which are a priori less favorable
to economic development.
This correlation could merely re-
flect the influence of other com-
mon determinants, such as na-
tional institutions, education or
past levels of economic develop-
ment. But a deeper analysis, de-
tails of which can be found in
Tabellini (2008; 2009), reveals
that this is not the case: once we
control for country-fixed effects
and other regional variables, in-
cluding school enrolment in
1960, urbanization in 1850 and
literacy in 1880, culture and per
capita output still appear posi-
tively correlated, as we can see from the interpolant
in Figure 2.
According to this specification,a difference in culture
of 50,such as between Lombardy and a typical region
in Southern Italy,is predicted to be associated with a
difference in GDP per capita of about one third of the
EU average;this would be tantamount to accounting
for almost half of the observed income difference be-
tween Lombardy and Southern Italy.
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Figure 1
1 Belgium,France,Italy,Netherlands,Portugal,Spain,UK and West
Germany.
2 Beugelsdijk, and von Schaik (2001) also study the correlation be-
tween social capital and per capita output in European regions,but
do not attempt to link social capital to history nor to account for en-
dogeneity.
3 Pc_culture is constructed to include four cultural variables ex-
trapolated from the World Value Surveys:trust,respect,control and
obedience.Controlcaptures one’s belief in individual effort and ini-
tiative, which is correlated with generalized morality, while obedi-
ence captures a cultural emphasis on hierarchy as opposed to egal-
itarianism, and is correlated with limited morality. Pc_culture is
strongly positively correlated with trust and respect and represents
an overall indicator of the cultural traits favourable to well-func-
tioning institutions.CESifo DICE Report 1/2009 17
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This strong correlation between culture and econom-
ic development, however, does not by itself imply a
causal link which goes from culture to development.
The key difficulty in estimating a causal effect of cul-
ture is that it is endogenous to economic development
and poses problems of reverse causality:not only does
“good culture” induce “good institutions” and devel-
opment,as we wish to show,but “good institutions”in-
duce “good culture” as well, as underlined by the so-
called modernization theory (e.g.,Inglehart and Baker
2000). In other words, the correlation we have high-
lighted may be due in whole or in part to the fact that
economic development induces values consistent with
generalized morality, rather than the other way
around. In order to rule out this reverse causality, we
have to rely on some exogenous source of variation in
culture,resorting to the technique of instrumental vari-
able regression (“two-stage regression”).
Instead of culture, we consider an “instrument” for
culture: the quality of political institutions ruling the
region in the distant past (i.e., before the countries
considered became unified). The crucial identifying
assumption is that past institutional quality affects
current values but has no direct impact on current de-
velopment. Under this hypothesis, if we find any im-
pact of past institutional quality on current develop-
ment, this effect must necessarily occur through cul-
ture,according to the causal mechanism:early politi-
cal institutions => regional cultural traits => current
development. The reverse causality problem is then
ruled out,since current development can by no means
have affected past political institutions.
These identifying assumptions require a careful
evaluation. A first-stage regression of current cul-
ture on past institutional quality, measured by con-
sidering checks and balances on the regional exec-
utives between 1600 and 1850,reveals a robust cor-
relation: past institutional quality indeed seems to
shape current regional cultural traits.This is consis-
tent with the idea that regions where despotic gov-
ernments exploited citizens are likely to have in-
herited a culture of mistrust and limited morality,
whereas regions ruled by republican regimes,where
participation is promoted and the rule of law is re-
spected are likely to have inherited a culture of gen-
eralized morality. It is also interesting to note that,
on the other hand, no significant correlation is
found between current culture and urbanization in
1850.This supports the identifying assumption that
contemporaneous cultural traits do not just reflect
economic development in previous centuries, but
rather the political environment in which previous
generations used to live.
The second assumption, i.e., that past institutional
quality has no direct correlation with current devel-
opment, appears reasonable, although it cannot be
tested directly.What we are assuming is that,once we
control for past economic development as measured
by literacy in 1880 and urbanization in 1850, institu-
tions in place before the unification have no impact
on current development. This is tantamount to as-
suming that 150 years of unification and national poli-
cies have made up for those regional differences in
development which are due to the inheritance of pre-
vious regimes.Under these assumptions,the remain-
ing differential in current development across regions
is attributed to differences in culture.
Resorting to history as an instrument for culture,the
estimated impact of culture on output is still positive
and significant,and appears to be larger compared to
the simpler specification.In other words,the cross-re-
gional variation in culture that can be attributed to
history appears to be more strongly correlated with
development compared to the overall measures of
culture. This result, however, should be considered
with caution: the two-stage regression could yield
higher estimates due to the invalidity of the instru-
ments or measurement error.
These findings are very robust to adding other re-
gressors, alternative measures of values, or alterna-
tive estimation strategies, as discussed extensively in
Tabellini (2008; 2009).
Figure 2The evidence presented so far supports the idea that
culture is a long-run determinant of output,measured
in levels. But does culture affect also regional eco-
nomic growth in the short run? The evidence suggests
that it does.The analysis sketched so far can be repli-
cated, using as a dependent variable regional output
growth over the period 1977–2000.Again,we find that
the component of regional values explained by dis-
tant political history has a positive and significant as-
sociation with regional growth.In particular,accord-
ing to the estimated coefficient,if Southern Italy had
the same culture as Lombardy, its average yearly
growth rate would have been higher by almost
0.5 percent (Tabellini 2009).
Summing up, all the instrumental variable estimates
discussed portray a remarkably consistent and robust
picture:first,past political institutions and low litera-
cy rates left a mark on regional culture; second, this
cultural legacy of history is an important determinant
of current economic performance.Moreover,the da-
ta cannot reject that past political institutions and lit-
eracy rates of previous generations influence eco-
nomic performance only through culture.
A further interesting piece of evidence of how re-
gional differences in culture can explain divergent in-
stitutional outcomes comes from the analysis of
Italian voting behavior. In ongoing preliminary
work,Nannicini et al.(2009) test the hypothesis that
voters sharing norms of generalized morality de-
mand higher standards of behavior on their elected
representatives.
In Italy prosecutors cannot investigate elected repre-
sentatives unless they first obtain authorization to do
so by Parliament. Prosecutors’
requests to proceed with criminal
investigations of elected repre-
sentatives (called RAP from here
on) are public knowledge. We
draw on data on Italian regional
elections before 1993, when vot-
ers could express preference
votes over individual candidates
to investigate how voters react to
RAP on incumbents in different
electoral districts.4 Controlling
for district and legislature fixed
effects, as well as individual fea-
tures of the incumbent, we find
that voters in regions with a bet-
ter political history,or with high-
er values of trust and respect, punish incumbents
more, in terms of preference votes, for having re-
ceived a RAP. In the regions with the lowest values
of trust and respect votes received by an incumbent
receiving a RAP increase slightly,although generally
by a negligible amount; conversely, in districts with
high values of trust and respect votes received drop
by as much as 20 percent to 35 percent,depending on
the specification, as summarized in Figure 3.
Implications for research and policy
The evidence presented casts doubts on the primacy
of formal institutions as determinants of economic
development. Instead it suggests that culture is like-
ly to interact with formal institutions influencing the
incentives and the behavior of economic and politi-
cal agents.
These findings suggest a promising research agenda.
Attention should be devoted to how values are
formed in the first place, why they reflect past insti-
tutions and how they are transmitted over time, fol-
lowing the line of research of Bisin and Verdier (2005)
and Fernandez (2007). It would be equally interest-
ing to investigate how values interact with formal in-
stitutions and incentives, in particular how do politi-
cal outcomes (eg.,targeted redistribution) shape cul-
tural traits (eg., reinforcing group identity); and vice
versa how culture influences political outcomes,
through voters’ behavior or in the formation of pres-
sure groups.
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If confirmed by future research, these findings also
suggest a number of relevant policy implications for
the regions of Europe and, in particular, Italy, which
is characterized by a persistent North-South divide.
The low labor productivity of economically backward
regions may be linked to adverse cultural traits pre-
vailing in those regions, implying that it is not likely
to go away soon.Income transfers and public invest-
ment cannot be a solution, because they do not ad-
dress the source of the problem. Instead, economi-
cally and culturally poor regions are likely to benefit
from investments in education,from cheap sources of
finance (to facilitate the emergence of local entre-
preneurs), and from a decentralization of adminis-
trative and political powers,in order to stimulate the
accumulation of social capital.These findings also re-
inforce the simple, but often neglected idea that re-
gions with lower productivity ought to pay lower re-
al wages: a single national wage concentrates unem-
ployment in the poor regions (as it happened in
Southern Italy and East Germany),self-perpetuating
the adverse cultural features that might be at the root
of the low labor productivity in these regions.
Moreover, this analysis suggests that the same poli-
cies may work differently in different regions, ac-
cording to the different values prevailing in those ar-
eas. For example, active labor market policies are
more likely to be abused in Southern Europe, where
values do not to discourage free riding. Decentra-
lization may lead to learning or to divergence: while
some regions may benefit from decentralization,oth-
ers may perform worse in a decentralized system.
Attention should also be devoted to how different
policy instruments influence values. More generally,
an effort should be made in order to individuate pol-
icy instruments which fit the value system, taking in-
to account how policies and values interact.
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